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Abstract 
 
In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation 
to contemporary “epistemic democracy.”  Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes 
democracy as a form of social inquiry.  But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy 
aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in 
political and other domains.  For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some 
fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own reflective satisfaction 
with the practical results.  I argue that this approach better reconciles epistemic democracy with 
traditional models of popular authority (“the will of the people”) and bolsters the defenses of the 
epistemic democrat against elitist alternatives.   
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is tempting to see Dewey as one of the historical originators of contemporary “epistemic 
democracy” (MacGilvray 2014; Anderson 2006)  Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of 
“social inquiry” in which the public’s diverse knowledge is brought to bear on common 
problems.  Relatedly, his defense of democracy makes no substantive appeal to procedural 
fairness or intrinsic rights of political participation. Like contemporary epistemic democrats, 
Dewey seems to see epistemic output rather than procedural fairness as democracy’s ultimate 
objective (Dewey 1927).   
 
And yet in many respects the connection between Dewey and contemporary epistemic 
democracy looks strained.  Conventionally understood, epistemic democracy holds that 
democracy is justified at least in part based on its “truth-tracking” tendencies (Estlund 2008; 
Goodin and Spiekermann 2018; Landemore 2013; Cohen 1986).  But, like other pragmatists, 
Dewey was deeply skeptical about the idea of “corresponding to truth” (Dewey 1920) and, while 
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talk of “knowledge” is pervasive in Dewey’s democratic theory, he does not treat truth as one of 
democracy’s aims. 
 
In this essay I situate Dewey’s approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary 
varieties. Dewey’s avoidance of truth-talk in the political context reflects a skepticism about the 
idea that, as Knight and Johnson put it, “in most political disputes or disagreements, there is a 
fact of the matter waiting to be discovered” (Knight and Johnson 2011: 130).  For Dewey, 
political inquiry is about figuring out improvements in our communal practice that enable us to 
flourish together; but the standard of success in this project is constituted by our reflective 
endorsement of the changes we produce. In this way, the standard of success is both something 
that, on the one hand, (a) we aim to discover, and, on the other, (b) we ourselves constitute.  
Conventional epistemic approaches to democracy capture (a) but not (b).  Dewey’s ability to 
capture (b), I will argue, better reconciles epistemic democracy with traditional models of 
popular authority (“the will of the people”), and bolsters the defenses of the epistemic democrat 
against elitist alternatives.   
 
Of course, it is possible that Dewey’s view succeeds in this respect while nonetheless failing on 
its own terms.  Below I attempt to situate Dewey’s views, such as they are, relative to epistemic 
democracy, but largely avoid addressing more general objections to his approach.  Others have 
taken up a more comprehensive defense of Deweyanism elsewhere (Pappas 2008; Knight and 
Johnson 2011; Westbrook 1991), and I must defer to their work on the present occasion. 
 
2. Agnosticism About Political “Truth” 
 
Following Joshua Cohen’s original formulation, epistemic democrats hold that there is “some 
standard of correctness” which is “independent of current consensus and the outcomes votes” 
(Cohen 1986: 34). But they tend to be agnostic about the specific nature of the correctness 
standard.  “Truth” is treated simply as a placeholder for whatever standard of correctness is in 
fact the right one: 
 
“By ‘correct or right decision’ here, or ‘the truth,’ can be meant an array of things, from 
objective truth of the matter (about facts or morality) to a more intersubjective, culturally-
dependent, and temporary construct (about more socially constructed facts or moral 
questions).  What epistemic democrats emphasize…is merely the Habermasian (and 
commonsensical enough) point that we wouldn’t be exchanging reasons in the first place if 
we did not believe that there was something to figure out, whether we call this something the 
truth, the right, or the correct, just or socially useful answer.” (Estlund and Landemore 2018: 
113)1 
 
																																																						
1 Quoted in (Goodin and Spiekermann 2018: 12) 
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This generic approach to political truth is reflected in the primary lines of argument that 
epistemic democrats use, which tend to draw on a “wisdom of crowds” logic.  Hélène 
Landemore’s approach (2013) offers a prime example.  Landemore argues for the epistemic 
advantages of democracy by appealing to Lu Hong and Scott Page’s “Diversity Trumps Ability 
Theorem” (DTA) (Hong and Page 2004).  The DTA says that, under several specific conditions, 
a large number of non-experts will outperform a small group of experts in problem-solving.  The 
particulars of the DTA are not important for present purposes, but the key to the idea lies in the 
advantages of cognitive diversity, which is what enables larger groups of only modestly 
competent problem solvers to beat elite, but more cognitively homogeneous, groups.  From this 
point of view, Landemore argues, the key feature of democracy is that universal enfranchisement 
is a way of ensuring cognitive diversity among “problem solvers” given a set of diverse and 
unpredictable problems. 
 
The important point for present purposes is that the DTA is potentially applicable to pretty much 
any problem-solving context, so long as the problems at hand are neither extremely easy nor 
extremely difficult.2  The argument for democratic approaches to political inquiry, in this respect, 
is no different from the argument for democratic approaches to any other domain of inquiry with 
that kind of profile.  Indeed, in constructing examples to illustrate DTA in the political context, 
Landemore focuses on cases where substantive normative questions are not in play.  In this way, 
the epistemology of politics is treated as a particularly broad domain of practical “problem-
solving” rather than a sphere of inquiry with unique epistemic properties.   
 
For example, Landemore’s central real-world illustration involves a case in which the local 
community must figure out how to reduce muggings on a particular bridge (100-102).  
“Reducing muggings” is an uncontroversial objective, and the case is described in a way that 
abstracts from the sorts of factors that typically make political issues difficult: contentious trade-
offs, value conflicts, or differential effects on community interests.  All of these factors point to 
what is arguably the defining feature of political deliberation, which is the fact that the 
autonomous judgments of the people themselves play a critical role in determining what counts 
as a genuine problem, and what counts as a good solution.  Landemore’s approach does not take 
on this set of issues, which makes it harder to see how it is supposed to handle the kinds of 
contentious moral issues – abortion, religious rights, free speech, etc. – which define a pluralistic 
democratic society.  It also raises the worry that democracy’s radical egalitarianism is 
dispensable.  If the primary benefit of democracy is cognitive diversity, then why wouldn’t the 
DTA yield much better results through some subset of better qualified, but cognitively diverse 
groups (Brennan 2016: 184)?  To be clear, this is not intended as some kind of knock-down 
																																																						
2 If a problem is easy, then any group is likely to solve it, and the advantages of cognitive diversity over expertise 
disappear.  If a problem is extremely hard, then cognitive diversity will not be enough to match the mastery of 
experts. 
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objection to Landemore’s approach; the point for present purposes is simply to highlight some of 
its limitations. 
 
Similar points apply to arguments that draw on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), which serves 
as the centerpiece of a major recent statement on epistemic democracy from Robert Goodin and 
Kai Spiekermann (2018).  The CJT states roughly that, if the average competence among voters 
is better than random then, as the size of the group of voters increases, the probability that they 
will choose the true (“correct”) option rapidly approaches 1.  Like Landemore, Goodin and 
Spiekermann state explicitly that their view does not depend on any substantive assumptions 
about the nature of the correctness standard.  This makes sense given that, ultimately, the logic of 
the CJT is based on the power of large numbers, and the primary epistemic advantage of 
democracy is simply that it delivers a large body of inquirers.  On this view, there is nothing 
special about political inquiry as such that makes democracy advantageous, and if there were a 
smaller body of elites with superior “competence,” there is nothing in principle which would 
block the inference to rule-of-the-wise (“epistocracy”).  Indeed, Goodin and Spiekerman 
themselves are perfectly clear about the limitations of their argument, noting that epistemic 
considerations alone are unlikely to provide a sufficient rationale for universal enfranchisement 
(238-239). 
 
As much as anything else, David Estlund’s (2008) work on “epistemic proceduralism” has been 
foundational in developing an epistemic account of democracy.  Like those above, Estlund 
explicitly avoids committing himself to any substantive conception of political truth.  Instead, he 
evaluates democracy’s epistemic prospects primarily in terms of its capacity to avoid a specific 
list of “primary bads”: war, famine, economic collapse, political collapse, epidemic, and 
genocide. In a Rawlsian spirit, he suggests that these would be recognized by all “reasonable 
comprehensive views” as serious harms (162-163).    
 
The advantage of focusing on primary-bad-avoidance is that it allows Estlund to pursue an 
epistemic defense of democracy without tethering himself to any controversial account of the 
good.  So long as the primary bads would be weighty on any plausible correctness standard, the 
epistemic argument for democracy can go through.  The disadvantage of this approach, however, 
is that the relationship between “correctness” and the contingent attitudes of the citizenry – “the 
will of the people” – remains unclear.  This question becomes vitally important when there is 
disagreement about important issues.  Even a primary bad such as war is sometimes justified 
and, as Estlund himself notes (163-164), that tends to inspire reasonable contestation about its 
justifiability, scope, and appropriate execution.  Estlund’s approach suggests that epistemic 
criteria only kick in under the relatively limited set of conditions in which there is a very strong 
consensus about the correctness standard.  At the same time, when the scope of epistemic 
success is so tightly circumscribed around primary bads, it is not clear that democracy would 
tend to beat more elitist alternatives.  Indeed, Estlund notably does not stake his view to that 
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stronger argument.  Instead, his primary defense against epistocracy is on procedural rather than 
epistemic grounds, i.e., that no epistocracy would be justifiable from all “qualified” points of 
view.  Thus, while Estlund’s theory insists on the importance of epistemic criteria, the epistemic 
properties of democracy ultimately play a limited justificatory role. 
 
3. The Deweyan Alternative 
 
Unlike the approaches above, Dewey’s take on political epistemology offers a substantive 
account of good political “outcomes.”  As noted above, however, his approach is distinctly 
skeptical of the idea that political truth is something “waiting to be discovered.”  In this section I 
sketch Dewey’s general understanding of inquiry, and then move on to characterize his 
understanding of democratic inquiry in particular.  Once the Deweyan approach is in place, I 
return in the next section to pursue the contrast with contemporary epistemic democracy.   
 
Dewey’s view of inquiry does not invoke a standard concept of truth and he takes pains 
throughout his work to distance himself from the idea. Being the good pragmatist that he is, 
Dewey tends to characterize inquiry as an attempt to solve practical “problems” and successful 
theory-making ultimately involves the generation of ideas which enable us to do that.  So “truth,” 
for Dewey, is a matter of providing successful guidance in action (Dewey 1920: 169-172). The 
language of “problem-solving” makes him sound a bit like Landemore.  But the resemblance 
here is merely terminological. 
 
For Dewey, problems arise from the experience of frustration or dissatisfaction – “something the 
matter” (Dewey 1920: 141) – with some idea or set of ideas as they function in our lives. Inquiry 
involves the attempt to improve those ideas in ways that alleviate this dissatisfaction, and that 
requires experimentation. In the case of natural science, puzzles about the natural world arise 
from gaps in our present theories that lead to failures of explanation.  Scientists generate 
hypotheses, which constitute potential revisions in the scientific community’s established set of 
beliefs, and these are tested through deliberate manipulations of the natural world (experiments) 
which generate novel experiences.  Hypotheses which generate satisfactory predictions and 
explanations of what is observed are absorbed into theory and these revisions, in turn, generate 
yet further puzzles and interventions. Epistemically successful theories are those which are 
ultimately responsive to problems salient in human experience – they allow us to answer 
questions that we care about, and the test of a good answer is that it resolves the experience of 
frustration which gave rise to inquiry (1938). 
 
One of the most notable features of Dewey’s epistemology is his view that inquiry into questions 
of value is not categorically different from inquiry into matters of fact about the natural world.  
That is why he sees “science” as the overarching paradigm for epistemology in both factual and 
normative domains.  Inquiry into matters of value arises from durable dissatisfaction – a 
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“problem” – with the status quo in our experience of moral norms and practices.  A process then 
ensues in which the moral community deliberates about different potential changes in our 
practice.  On Dewey’s view, moral claims amount to hypotheses about whether we, as a moral 
community, will experience a social world transformed by the relevant changes in our moral 
practice as satisfactory.  Successful moral inquiry thus involves making accurate projections 
about human experience within a particular context of practice (1939b; 1922).  And doing that  
requires the input of natural and social science, as well as a cultivated sympathetic imagination 
(Fesmire 2003).   
 
The idea that moral inquiry involves hypotheses about the generation of human satisfaction 
makes Dewey sound as if he is some kind of utilitarian.  But Dewey criticizes utilitarianism on 
the grounds that it collapses all of our aims under one single rubric of “happiness.”  On Dewey’s 
view, ends like liberty, fairness, community, and creativity all constitute different forms of 
flourishing, and they engender different kinds of subjective response.  Unlike “happiness,” which 
connotes a hedonic experience, “satisfaction” encompasses the plurality of affective responses 
associated with different kinds of goods (Dewey and Tufts 1932: 301-303; Dewey 1922: 199-
209).  Likewise, satisfaction is not a brute affective response.  It is informed by information, 
argumentation, and rational cognition.  The satisfaction associated with a successful theory of 
freedom sustains endorsement upon informed rational reflection (1922: 248-264; 1920: 170). 
 
To see how this works, consider the value of freedom, which figures as a prominent example in 
Dewey’s writing.  What is the correct theory of freedom?  Dewey observes that this question, 
which figures prominently in philosophical theory, emerges within a particular historical context 
defined by the legacy of political and economic innovations in the 18th century.  In the late 18th 
century, Dewey notes, the value of freedom emerges as a response to the over-bearing and 
coercive tendencies of the monarchy. Freedom as non-interference served as a powerful 
alternative to the status quo at that time.  However, with the rise of the free market and mass 
production through the 19th Century, Dewey observes that human agency was increasingly 
limited, not by overbearing political authorities, but by the imperatives of survival within a 
market system (1927: 87-110).  A progressive notion of liberalism – one encompassing more 
substantial forms of redistribution and state interventions in the market – thus emerges as a 
hypothesis about how to improve human life.  On this story, progressivism introduces an 
intervention that solves a problem (1939a). 
 
On Dewey’s view, political life emerges from the fact that our lives as individuals intersect with 
the lives of others.  Our practices generate substantial consequences for one another which 
require mutual accountability, and there are many goods that are impossible to realize unless we 
coordinate action through shared institutions.  Democracy arises as an institutional approach for 
this coordination and accountability.  Democracy constitutes a kind of inquiry, then, because it 
involves the experimental pursuit of norms and practices which will generate shared flourishing 
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under conditions of co-existence.  In effect, democracy takes the model of normative inquiry that 
I sketched above and adopts it on a mass social scale.  Political questions are questions about 
how we ought to act together.  The need for inquiry arises from the durable experience of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo within the public (1927).   
 
Dewey sees democracy’s characteristic institutions of election, representation, and rights of 
political and civic participation as important but historically contingent devices for inquiry 
(1927: 82-85).  But his account of political inquiry suggests a natural interpretation of these 
institutions: they provide a mechanism for the articulation of durable social frustrations – 
“problems” – which, in turn, initiates a process of deliberation about what sort of intervention in 
our practices would resolve those problems.  Egalitarian political rights, fair elections, basic civil 
liberties, and processes of public deliberation are crucial to this process of inquiry in two 
fundamental respects.  First, they provide channels for identifying problems with the status quo 
across the full spectrum of society, and for considering potential changes in response to those 
problems from all points of view.  Democracies thus create mechanisms for sharing information 
and arguments in a way that protects against the tendency of centralized power to marginalize 
the concerns of those who are less powerful.   
 
On its own, however, pooling information and perspectives is not enough to engender shared 
flourishing, and that is because the satisfaction of disparate groups is highly contingent on the 
particularity of their life experiences and their tendency toward mutual sympathy and 
identification.  Thus, the second crucial feature of democracy on Dewey’s view is that it sustains 
shared experiences and mutual identification in the social crossroads: public institutions of 
culture and education (1927: 143-184; 1916) .  For this reason, Dewey argues, democracy cannot 
be understood only in terms of its characteristic decision procedures and formal rights; it is “the 
idea of community life itself” (1927: 148).  But this communitarian ambition is only attainable 
against the backdrop of robust opportunities for ongoing contestation: “the adjustment of 
interests demands that diverse interests have the opportunity to articulate themselves” (1939a: 
154).  Dewey seems to treat social consensus in the public sphere – “shared meanings” (1927: 
153) – as a kind of regulative ideal while acknowledging the inevitability of ongoing 
disagreement, and the value of maintaining a plurality of ideas and practices for further inquiry 
(1939a: 131).  
 
The recent history of gay rights in the United States stands out as a particularly compelling 
illustration of democratic epistemology as Dewey understands it.3  In 2004, Americans were 
opposed to same-sex marriage by a margin of 60% to 31%.  In 2019, that has flipped almost 
perfectly, with 61% now supporting it and 31% opposing (Pew Center 2019).  A brief sketch of 
that transition goes like this4: Beginning in the 1960s, gay Americans began to articulate, in 
																																																						
3 The next two paragraphs draw on the more developed account offered in (Fuerstein 2016). 
4 (Faderman 2015) offers a good account of the relevant history. 
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particularly public and forceful ways, their deep dissatisfaction with the status quo.  Social 
agitation led to greater awareness, which facilitated deliberation among various mini-publics, 
which led to a growing array of anti-discrimination measures and gradual changes in the social 
acceptability of anti-gay attitudes and discourse.  These changes in turn facilitated yet further 
representation of gay experience in public life – in politics, the media, and culture – which in 
turn facilitated further deliberation, further policy changes, and a gradual shift towards 
sympathetic identification with gay Americans.   
 
There are a few features of this episode worth drawing attention to, though in this context I can 
only offer a suggestive story.  The first is that the validity of gay rights is discovered, not through 
rational deliberation about moral principles alone, but instead through an experimental social 
process of trying out progressively more expansive rights regimes.  This is one respect in which 
Dewey’s model of democratic inquiry differs crucially from the approach favored by deliberative 
democrats (Fuerstein 2016).  Rational arguments in favor of equality remained unchanged since 
at least the 1960s; the expanding social endorsement of same-sex marriage arises from the 
experience of living in a world where those rights exist.  That is because the public appraisal of 
reasons is dependent on emotional dispositions that make the relevant concerns salient (Railton 
2014; Lerner et al. 2015; Damasio 1994; Hall 2007; Krause 2008), and therefore on experiences 
and social relationships which support shifts in affective cognition (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; 
Pettigrew et al. 2011).  Rational cognition about formal rights is, on the Deweyan model, 
necessarily informed by affective capacities that make the concerns of other social groups 
salient, and that guide our practical understanding of abstract principles.  Democracy plays an 
essential role in this process, because democracy enables the articulation of grievances before the 
public, it enables broad social deliberation about the concerns articulated, it enables agitation for 
interventions in social practice, and it provides levers of formal power for realizing change.  
 
To summarize: On Dewey’s view, “correct” political outcomes are those which engender 
durable, reflective satisfaction across the citizenry under conditions of practice.  Statements 
about what the government ought to do involve implicit hypotheses that acting in some way or 
other will yield outcomes which improve in this respect on the status quo.  Democracy is critical 
from an epistemological point of view because the experience of citizens varies substantially 
across diverse social identities and practical circumstances.  It is therefore necessary to consult in 
a wide and egalitarian manner in order to make reliable projections of the experience associated 
with different political actions.  
 
4.  How the Deweyan Model Differs from Epistemic Democracy, and Why it Provides a 
Better Response to Epistocracy 
 
Let’s return now to consider the relationship between Dewey’s approach and the one favored by 
epistemic democrats.  Dewey’s model of political inquiry is epistemic in that the standard at 
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which it aims is independent of our presently existing attitudes and choices.  It is objective in that 
sense.  This is because correct outcomes, from Dewey’s perspective, are characterized by a 
particular counterfactual: what a wide swath of citizens would experience as satisfactory under 
informed, reflective conditions of practice.  But whether or not some course of action meets that 
standard is a matter of fact that is independent of citizens’ present subjective attitudes.  In this 
sense, the Deweyan standard of success is epistemic. 
 
Thus, widespread opposition to same-sex marriage was partly based on brute tradition, but was 
also based on false factual claims.  One of these, for example, is the view that the welfare of 
children of same-sex couples would be at risk, a claim now widely rejected by psychologists 
(Tasker 2005; Wainright et al. 2004).  Objections to same-sex marriage were also founded on 
antipathies which have proven unstable in the more socially integrated world supported by gay 
rights.  The growing provision for marital rights and various anti-discrimination measures has 
corresponded to rapid changes in public and cultural expressions of gay identity.  In turn, there 
have been correspondingly large changes in attitudes towards homosexuality, particularly but not 
exclusively among the young (Pew Center 2019). The end of this story has not yet been written, 
but there is no sign that these trends will not continue.  
 
The large gaps in public attitudes before and after the steady introduction of gay rights support a 
Deweyan model of objectivity about public decision-making.  Pre-existing hostilities to gay 
rights were substantially sustained through the suppression of those very rights. From a Deweyan 
point of view, the continued spread and reflective stability of sympathies for gay rights under 
conditions of their practical implementation is evidence of their “correctness.”  That is, it is 
evidence of the continued durability of reflective satisfaction – at least into the near future – with 
a gay rights regime under conditions of informed practice.  The validity of gay rights is 
something that had to be discovered through experimental interventions in social practice which 
reconfigured social relationships and affections, and the objectivity of political inquiry is 
revealed in the difference between what citizens believed about gay rights prior to their practical 
implementation, and their (still unfolding) experience of that implementation.  No doubt, our 
present approach remains imperfect, and further questions, complexities, and challenges remain 
open to further experimentation. Improving this kind of projection, and making continual 
changes to our practice in response, is the essence of social inquiry as Dewey understands it. 
 
The objectivity of Deweyan inquiry is what situates it under the rubric of epistemic democracy.  
At the same time, we can now appreciate how Dewey’s approach differs.  While the correctness 
of any given outcome is independent of citizens’ actual attitudes, it is constituted by the 
subjective attitudes – what I have been calling “reflective satisfaction” – they would have under 
conditions of informed practice.  This is the sense in which, on a Deweyan approach, the 
standards of success at which we aim are at the same time constituted by our own particular 
perspective on the world.   
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In this respect, one might be tempted to see a certain parallel between Dewey and moral 
constructivists like Habermas (1996), who conceptualize legitimate outcomes in terms of an 
idealized counterfactual: what would be accepted under optimal conditions of rational 
deliberation.  While I lack space for a careful comparison here, I’ll note nonetheless that 
Dewey’s approach is distinctive in its pragmatist emphasis on the contingency and historical 
particularity of social problems and what counts as a successful solution to them.  The problem 
presented by same-sex marriage is an artifact of numerous social and historical particularities: 
the legal and social meaning of marriage and the family, the liberal model of individual 
autonomy, the ideal of romantic love, and the particular history of anti-gay sentiment and 
oppression.  The very idea of “rights” to marriage, and the strong desire to participate in them, 
cannot be understand apart from these contingent social institutions and the particular set of 
aspirations that grow out of them.   
 
The example of “freedom,” discussed a bit earlier, also illustrates this point.  The proper social 
understanding of freedom, for Dewey, grows out of a particular set of historically conditioned 
problems: the harms of monarchical tyranny followed by the harms of market tyranny as their 
successor, all of which are connected to historically contingent technologies, institutions, 
practices, and desires.  For this reason, there is no ultimate ideal of freedom “waiting there to be 
discovered”; different societies face different problems, and successful forms of freedom are 
responsive to different problems.  In this way, the standard of correctness is never final.  It 
continues to evolve as societies change. 
 
On standard construals of epistemic democracy, the correctness of a given outcome is something 
that remains what it is independently of our own shifting subjective attitudes towards that 
outcome. For Dewey, however, the process of democratic inquiry – of deliberating and 
ultimately testing options through experience – causes transformations of our attitudes towards a 
given outcome which themselves bear on its correctness under a particular set of social 
conditions. Whereas epistemic democrats tend to emphasize the role of democracy in 
aggregating dispersed information, Dewey sees the epistemic benefits of democracy as much in 
its capacity to facilitate progressive transformations of our subjective experience.  That is why he 
is so keen to emphasize the affective dimensions of democratic society, and the role of 
communal institutions in building up a core of common, sympathetic experience. 
 
When I canvassed several approaches to epistemic democracy earlier, I noted in each case the 
potential for a challenge from more elitist forms of political organization.  The general reason for 
this is that the epistemic benefits of democracy in each case are contingent on factors – such as 
the number, competence, and cognitive diversity of inquirers – which might be defeated by a 
well-designed epistocracy.  Dewey’s approach to political inquiry has an advantage in this 
respect because of the role that citizens’ subjective attitudes play in constituting correct 
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outcomes.  Correct outcomes involve improvements in human experience across a broad and 
heterogeneous set of social groups.  Achieving those improvements depends on the kind of 
technical knowledge held by elites.  But it also depends on the varied landscape of constraints, 
grievances, capacities, and aspirations distributed among citizens without relevant technical 
expertise.   
 
Once again, the same-sex marriage case illustrates this point nicely: the problem of gay rights is 
something that arises from the distinctive frustrations and humiliations of living “in the closet.”  
And an adequate solution likewise depends on how successfully it improves human experience 
across diverse circumstances. Addressing that kind of challenge does indeed require trained 
lawyers, economists, sociologists, and philosophers.  But there is no subset of elites who could 
reliably represent and attend to the full spectrum of relevant concerns, and there is no body of 
technical knowledge which, on its own, suffices to project human experience in this domain.  
Similar sorts of points could be made in the case of other landmark questions surrounding 
gender, race, and religion.  From a Deweyan point of view, inquiry requires a continual 
interchange between diverse “ordinary” citizens and people with varying forms of technical 
expertise.  This is one reason why Dewey was so insistent on the need to break down the 
traditional divide between intellectual and “practical” or “vocational” tracks in the educational 
system (1916).  Democracy is the only social structure which supports that kind of interchange 
on a systemic level. 
 
It is tempting to think that more technical kinds of policy questions would be different, but here 
Dewey insists, once again, on the foundational epistemic significance of varied human 
experience.  To choose one example of particular significance at present, consider the case of 
economic policy.  The United States, and much of the globe, has in recent decades experienced 
remarkable economic growth.  Those gains have nonetheless been distributed highly unequally, a 
fact which bears on the present rise of global populism and broad dissatisfaction with the 
economic system.  Given the present situation, what constitutes an epistemically “correct” way 
of proceeding?  And why might we see democracy as crucial to identifying a better way 
forward?   
 
Here is a brief and speculative Deweyan analysis: the present populist moment grows in part out 
of the bifurcation of the population into knowledge elites and a large working class who have 
relatively little shared experience or sympathies.  Economic policy elites tend to focus on 
“growth” as an aggregate output even as questions of social relationships, power, dignity, and 
meaning remain side issues at best (this point is particularly true in the American context, where 
labor rights and power have been on the decline for decades).  An understanding of the problem 
to be solved thus requires an understanding, not only of economic factors which contribute to 
growth, inequality, wage stagnation, etc., but also of the widespread sense of loss, indignity, and 
vulnerability that arise in the present economic transition. 
 12 
 
An understanding of the solution likewise requires thinking through the complex interaction 
between economic policies and the experience of human beings vulnerable to replacement by 
robots, global outsourcing, and newcomers willing to perform the same work for lower pay, or 
under harsher working conditions.  Universal basic income (UBI), for example, is currently a hot 
topic among PhDs thinking about the problem of displaced labor.  But UBI represents that 
problem principally in terms of lost income; it does not address the question of how to replace 
the sense of purpose and (for some) community that work has often provided.  Doing so requires 
a deeper engagement with the textured experience of workers in a globalized and automated 
economy.  For Dewey, the point is that no room full of PhDs could, on its own, produce an 
adequate framing of the problem or its potential solutions.  What we need, instead, is a robust 
and ongoing social interaction between those with high level technical knowledge and diverse 
non-experts “on the ground.”  Epistocracy fails, not only because scientific elites are likely to be 
motivationally corrupted in various ways, but also because scientific elites lack the knowledge 
they need, on their own, to articulate and solve vital social problems.  Epistocracy fails, that is, 
on epistemic terms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Dewey’s approach to political epistemology models the objectivity of correctness standards 
favored by epistemic democrats.  But it also captures the dependence of those standards on the 
contingent attitudes of citizens.  In that way, his approach represents the normative significance 
of the popular will.  By attaching importance to the diverse lived experience of citizens, Dewey 
also offers a much stronger defense of democracy’s comparative epistemic value.     
 
Dewey’s approach is notably complex and, admittedly, the account above moves quickly past a 
number of important worries.5  While I lack the space to address those worries, I will note in 
closing that many of the advantages of Dewey’s approach can plausibly be retained without 
taking on some of his more contentious claims.  Consider, in particular, Dewey’s suggestion that 
inquiry aims at improvements in “reflective satisfaction” across society.  That claim is significant 
because it implies the need to consult widely with citizens about their lived experience.  Still, 
there are other ways of explaining the value of that kind of consultation.  One, for example, 
might be traditional utilitarianism; if the causes and conditions of happiness vary substantially 
across the citizenry, then that suggests the importance of recruiting a wide array of perspectives.  
Another approach to this topic (more appealing in my view) draws on the importance of 
autonomy.  Suppose that autonomy is a fundamental aspect of correct political outcomes; and 
suppose that realizing autonomy requires attending to the widely varied aspirations, 
impediments, and experiences of a diverse citizenry.  On that assumption, it looks doubtful that 
any body of elites would be positioned, on their own, to attend adequately to liberty (Fuerstein 
																																																						
5 See (Talisse 2011) for a particularly trenchant critique. 
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forthcoming).  A widely inclusive, broadly egalitarian, model of social inquiry would probably 
be the right one. 
 
These are just suggestive remarks.  The point is that Dewey’s understanding of political inquiry 
delivers an insight which extends beyond his own controversial ethics and epistemology.  The 
insight is that democracy derives its epistemic value, not only from the general benefits of large 
numbers, diversity, or an open contestation of ideas, but also from the fact that politics is 
intrinsically oriented towards the shifting and varied texture of human life in modern, pluralistic 
societies.  Democracy creates a social architecture unique in its capacity to represent that varied 
texture at the level of decision-making.  This point deserves greater attention in the present 
conversation surrounding democracy’s epistemic dimensions. 
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